Introduction
As a result of a referendum on its membership of the EU on 23 June 2016, in which 51.9 percent of votes cast were to leave the EU and 48.1 percent were to remain, on a turnout of 72.7 percent (Electoral Commission, 2016) , the UK is set to leave the EU ('Brexit'), possibly as early as 11 p.m. (British time) on 29 March 2019. Quite what this will mean for the UK's future trade relations with the EU, and the rest of the world, is yet to be determined. This article focuses on the political economy constraints, and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, that will influence the outcome, particularly with regard to trade in agricultural commodities and food and drink products (see also Swinbank 2017a Swinbank , 2017b , and on the quest for a free trade area (FTA) with Australia.
Two issues are highlighted. First, that although the EU's common agricultural policy (CAP) has undergone a number of reforms since the 1990s, and consequently is rather less trade-distorting than the 'old' CAP of the 1970s and 1980s (Swinbank and Daugbjerg 2017) , it is still characterised by excessively high tariffs on a number of products: on beef, butter and cheese, and sugar, for example. Second, that a rather critical border between a post-Brexit UK and the remaining members of the EU (referred to as EU 27 in this article) is the one on the island of Ireland dividing the Republic of Ireland from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. How to keep that border open, and not return to The Troubles of the past, 1 is a major concern. The article proceeds as follows. The first section sets the scene by recalling the impact on Australian agriculture of the UK's accession to the European Economic Community (EEC). 2 The second section outlines changes to the CAP, prompted in large part by international pressure in the Uruguay Round. These changes did not, however, extend to subsequent reductions in agricultural tariffs. The third section discusses some of the difficulties the UK is encountering in attempting to redefine its post-Brexit trade relations with EU 27, emphasising in particular the high import tariffs that are still charged on many CAP products and the difficulties this might cause for agri-food trade over the Irish border. With these constraints in mind, the fourth section asks what sort of agrifood trade deal for Australia, if any, might emerge, whilst the fifth section concludes.
The year 1973 and accession of the UK to the EEC The UK's accession to the EEC in 1973-and a phased harmonisation of the UK's farm support and agricultural tariffs with those of the EEC, which was to be completed on 1 January 1978-led to considerable trade diversion. Prior to accession, the UK had been a major market for Australia's agricultural exports, but for several products these export opportunities were closed, as illustrated in Table 1 . Whilst New Zealand obtained concessions on butter, and for a limited period for cheese (Lodge 1982) , no similar BAE (1985, 333) . Original data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation. p = preliminary data at the time arrangements were put in place for other developed countries. The developing country suppliers of raw cane sugar under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, for refining in the UK, were accommodated, but not Australia (Webb 1977) .
Zeros do not dominate the last column of Table 1 because of trade concessions negotiated with the EU. In the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), launched in 1973 and concluded in 1979, Australia (and others) had obtained tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) enabling it to sell limited quantities of beef and cheese to the EU without paying the EU's full variable import levy. With the introduction of a common support policy for sheepmeat in 1980, New Zealand had negotiated a voluntary restraint agreement (in effect a TRQ) with the EU, with the arrangements later extended to Australia and others, reducing the EU's tariff from 20 percent to, eventually, 0 percent on these supplies. In the Uruguay Round, these TRQs were incorporated into the EU's Schedule of Commitments.
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Quite how a post-Brexit UK, and EU 27, will share, or otherwise assume responsibility for these TRQs is as yet unknown (and is not explored in this article).
Australia's discontent with the EEC, and in particular with its CAP, has been widely documented (see, for example, BAE 1985; Benvenuti 1999) . In March 1978, for example, Vic Garland, then Minister for Special Trade Representations, claimed that 'Australia is the country worst affected by the enlargement of the EEC and its common agricultural policy'. In his view, the EEC was denying Australia 'the opportunity, the right, to compete in its markets. Worse, the EEC is disposing of the surpluses caused by its policies at heavily subsidised prices on third markets in which we would otherwise sell our products'.
The Uruguay Round and CAP reform
Although highly critical of the CAP, and strongly supportive of the USA's opening stance in the Tokyo Round on liberalising trade in agricultural products, Australia itself had limited leverage in that it was willing to offer little by way of easier access for industrial products onto its markets. Up to that time, Australia had intervened extensively in its economy-but much more so in the manufacturing sector than in agriculture. Thus, it suffered a 'credibility gap in its campaign for fairer and freer trade in agriculture' (Capling 2001, 93) . In the face of a steadfast European defence of its agricultural policy, in 1977 the Americans agreed to delink the negotiations on agriculture from those on industrial tariffs, allowing the Tokyo Round to be concluded without significant progress on agriculture (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2009, 78-79) .
The election of a Labor government in 1983 led to a fundamental reappraisal of Australian policy, including financial deregulation, floating the currency, and 'dramatic unilateral tariff reductions ' in 1988 ' in and 1991 ' in (Capling 2001 . Nonetheless, some farm sectors continued to receive support into the 1980s. Thus, dual pricing systems (under which Australian consumers paid higher prices than those earned from exports) raised farm-gate prices for some products, including sugar cane and milk, 'by significant amounts', and in 1986-87 a large deficiency payment was made to wheat producers (Mauldon 1990, 310) .
In the early 1980s, prior to the launch of the Uruguay Round at Punta del Este in September 1986, Australian officials developed 'an imaginative new approach to multilateral diplomacy' (Capling 2001, 105) . Australia emerged as a staunch advocate of free trade, and assisted in the formation, in August 1986, of the Cairns Group of like-minded 'fair traders' determined to play an active part in the forthcoming negotiations. Nonetheless, as Kenyon and Lee (2006, 73) concede, 'the extent to which members of the Cairns Group protected domestic agriculture, and their willingness to reform domestic support policies, varied significantly'.
It was, however, the USA and the EU that dominated the Uruguay Round negotiations. Scholars will no doubt continue to debate the causal factors that led to the inclusion of an Agreement on Agriculture in the package of agreements concluded in Marrakesh in 1994, and the extent to which these negotiations prompted the EU, in 1992, to undertake its first significant reform of its CAP (the MacSharry Reform). But the USA and EU's resolve that the whole Uruguay Round package had to be treated as a 'single undertaking', explicitly linking the agricultural negotiations to progress in other dossiers, was probably a decisive factor (Daugbjerg and Swinbank 2009, 90-93) .
In a series of 'reforms', beginning with that of 1992, the EU has made significant changes to the CAP (Swinbank and Daugbjerg 2017) . Despite this, the CAP's core raison d'être remains that of supporting farm incomes, however imperfectly defined or targeted. And one defining element of the 'old' CAP remains in place. Following the initial, and limited, reductions in import tariffs negotiated in the Uruguay Round, no significant most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff reductions have subsequently been implemented. CAP reform has embraced domestic support provisions, but has not extended to tariff reductions. 4 At one stage in the Doha Round negotiations, it did seem possible that the higher tariffs could be reduced by up to 70 percent (WTO 2008) , but with the Round in the doldrums, that prospect appears to have been lost. Consequently, MFN tariffs on a number of products (dairy, red meats and sugar, for example) remain prohibitively high, as illustrated later in this text, and imports are only possible under concessional terms (Swinbank 2017a) .
WTO rules provide for three systems of concessional access. First, WTO members can discriminate in favour of developing countries, provided they do so on an MFN basis. Thus, under its Everything But Arms scheme, the EU offers duty-and quota-free access for products originating within the least-developed countries (LDCs), giving access, for example, for sugar and rice to the EU's protected market. Second, as noted above, in the Uruguay Round, various country-specific TRQs were incorporated within the Schedules of Commitments of various WTO members, including the EU, but these give Australia rather limited access to the EU market (Hussey and Tidemann 2017, 104-106) . Third, and of particular relevance to this article, GATT Article XXIV allows WTO members to form FTAs and customs unions, within which products can move freely (although, for FTAs, this relates only to originating products, necessitating potentially complex rules of origin). In the following section, the article considers the prospects for future UK-EU 27 trade relations, whilst the fourth section assesses the aspirations of Australia's agri-food sector for a UK-Australia FTA.
Post-Brexit UK-EU 27 trade relations
Although the UK triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union on 29 March 2017 -implying that the UK will leave the EU in March 2019 unless other arrangements are negotiated-very little is yet known about the measures that will govern trade between the UK and EU 27 following Brexit.
By December 2017, it was more or less agreed by the EU 27's negotiator and the British government-but not yet formally ratified by treaty-that there was a need for a transition period (although the British preferred to refer to an implementation period) of about two years to avoid a 'cliff-edge' scenario in March 2019. During this transition, EU law (for example, the CAP) would continue to apply in the UK, the UK would be bound by the EU's trade agreements with third countries (i.e. no scope for implementing an Australia-UK FTA in that period), and the UK would have no say in EU decision-making (Negotiators 2017). A new UK-EU 27 trade agreement, to apply from the end of the transition period, could then be negotiated.
It is still possible that the UK will exit the EU-either by accident or design-without an alternative UK-EU 27 trade pact in place (some commentators, depending on their political persuasion, talk of a 'hard' Brexit, others of a 'clean' Brexit). The Article 50 negotiations did not start well, and there is no guarantee that they can be concluded successfully. Indeed, in the past, the British government has said that 'no deal for the UK is better than a bad deal for the UK' (Her Majesty's Government 2017c, 65). Moreover, hard-core Brexiteers remain adamant that a clean break is required, and was mandated by the referendum result. A number of prominent economists support this stance (see Economists for Free Trade 2017). Given the fluid and fervid nature of current UK politics, such an outcome cannot be discounted. Under such circumstances, trade between the UK and EU 27 would be regulated by WTO rules, but the UK would be free to unilaterally reduce its MFN tariffs (i.e. pursue free, or freer, trade) and/or negotiate FTAs with low-cost agricultural producers such as Australia.
The UK government has consistently said that, although exiting the EU means leaving both the Customs Union and Single Market (see Box 1), it is seeking 'a new customs arrangement that facilitates the freest and most frictionless trade possible in goods between the UK and the EU' (Her Majesty's Government 2017a, 2). That document talked about 'aligning our approach to the customs border in a way that removes the need for a UK-EU customs border', and of implementing 'technology-based solutions to make it easier to comply with customs procedures' (ibid.). GATT Article XXIV insists that, to be valid, members of a customs union must ensure that 'duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce … are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union' (my emphasis), and that 'substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union' . In this regard, the EU might be characterised as a perfect customs union in that it covers all trade between EU states, and a common external tariff applies on third-country imports. In contrast, the customs union between the EU and Turkey is only partial in that it does not include agricultural products. Non-tariff barriers can also restrict trade. Although some regulatory convergence between Turkey and the EU has been agreed, Turkey is not part of the EU's Single Market. The Single (or Internal) Market is based on EU law rather than WTO agreements. In seeking to achieve the free movement of goods-one of the 'four freedoms' for goods, services, capital and workers-the same regulatory regime applies in all the member states, or the principle of mutual recognition results in products legally produced in one member state being accepted throughout the Single Market. With its Customs Union covering all goods, and regulatory harmonisation or equivalence achieved in its Single Market, there is no need to apply border controls on goods within the EU. Once the EU's common external tariff has been paid, imports from third countries are in free circulation in the EU.
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, as members of the European Economic Area, are part of the EU's Single Market (but not of the Customs Union), and consequently have to accept and apply relevant regulatory provisions adopted by the EU. They have FTA agreements with the EU, rather than customs unions. Moreover, these FTA provisions do not extend to agriculture, and Norway et al. do not apply the CAP. Many of the EU's other FTAs-for example, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada-do not have full coverage of agricultural products.
Both FTAs and customs unions are governed by GATT Article XXIV. Collectively, they are referred to as regional trade agreements by the WTO. FTAs differ from customs unions in that only products produced within the FTA benefit from the 'free' trading provisions, and partners can maintain their own trade barriers against third-country products, necessitating complex rules of origin. The WTO also oversees preferential trade arrangements-such as a Generalised System of Preferences-which are not reciprocal.
7
Both sides in the Article 50 negotiations are insistent that the one land border between EU 27 and the UK-straddling the island of Ireland-is of critical importance. With regard to this complex issue, Paragraph 49 of the Joint Report said:
The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting North-South cooperation [between the two jurisdictions on the island of Ireland] and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with these overarching requirements. The United Kingdom's intention is to achieve these objectives through the overall EU-UK relationship. Should this not be possible, the United Kingdom will propose specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland. In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 [Good Friday or Belfast] Agreement (Negotiators 2017).
Agriculture and the EU's past failure to complete reform of its CAP present particular difficulties in this regard (Swinbank 2017a) . MFN tariffs on red meats, dairy products and sugar are particularly high, as already mentioned above and now illustrated in Table 2 . This is not to suggest that EU prices exceed world market prices by these amounts. There is considerable 'water' in many of these MFN tariffs, and EU market prices often approximate world levels. But they are the tariffs that EU 27 would be obliged to apply on imports from the UK in the absence of a FTA linking EU 27 and the UK, as under WTO rules (GATT Article I) EU 27 could not treat imports from the UK more favourably than imports from any other WTO member, and vice versa.
Sugar presents a particularly stark example. Ireland no longer produces sugar. Instead, it imports sugar (for both direct consumption and manufacturing purposes) from other EU member states. The EU's import regime is particularly complex, with a number of preferential access schemes (see, for example, Agbenyegah and Frawley 2017, 72-75) . This complexity of course extends to processed products containing sugar, on which comparably high MFN tariffs apply. The limited imports of sugar into the EU under preferential schemes consist largely of raw cane sugar for refining, with the UK the main import destination. Australia has access to a small country-specific TRQ, and so its sales of sugar to the EU are very limited.
If the UK and EU 27 fail to agree a FTA that includes agriculture, and revert to MFN tariffs, then trade in many agri-food products across the Irish border would be abruptly disrupted. Alternative scenarios are conceivable, but-in my judgement-highly unlikely: (a) During 2017, the average value of the euro (€) was AU$1.4732, within the range 1.3689-1.5693.
the EU significantly reduces its MFN tariffs on CAP products, abating the difficulties envisaged in this text; (b) Northern Ireland leaves the UK and unites with the Republic of Ireland within the EU; (c) Ireland leaves the EU and aligns its trade with UK agricultural policy, as was the case prior to 1973; or (d) Northern Ireland becomes a separate customs territory within the UK, aligning its farm tariffs with those of the EU, and necessitating customs controls within the UK between the island of Ireland and Great Britain. The latter corresponds to a rather contentious proposal the EU 27's negotiator advanced on 28 February 2018 in suggesting that, in the absence of alternative solutions to keep the border open, it might be necessary for Northern Ireland to remain within the EU Customs Union, and continue to apply the EU's sanitary and phytosanitary rules 'on the production and marketing of agricultural and fisheries products' (European Commission 2018, 101). However, this would seem to be a non-starter, as the UK government has said that it is implacably opposed to any proposal that would fracture the UK's own internal market. If prohibitively high MFN tariffs on many CAP products are to apply to EU imports from the UK, then shipments from the north of Ireland to the south would almost certainly cease, whereas the outcome for south-north trade would depend on the UK's trade policy stance: the UK could, for example, unilaterally reduce the MFN tariffs it applies on one or more products. Currently, large volumes of agricultural produce and processed products criss-cross this border as part of complex supply chains.
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Even if the UK and EU 27 negotiate a FTA that includes these goods, it is difficult to believe that Ireland, or the EU farm lobby, would be willing to accept free importation of sugar (and sugar-containing products) from a post-Brexit UK or, for that matter, beef or other highly protected CAP products, except under very strict circumstances. Prenotification of shipments for customs clearance and vehicle number-plate recognition technology, for example, might eliminate the need for a physical border-although EU sources have poured scorn on this idea-but shipments would still face a virtual border at which traders would need to demonstrate that the goods respected rules of origin, pay the appropriate tariff that might apply, and satisfy any regulatory requirements (sanitary and phytosanitary rules, for example).
When the two parties to a FTA apply similar, and modest, tariffs on imports from third countries, trade deflection is less likely to be important, and so rules of origin can perhaps be dispensed with. But when one of the two parties (the EU, say) imposes high tariffs on a particular product (for example, sugar), trade deflection is likely to become a real threat. Under these circumstances, restrictive rules of origin would almost certainly be rigorously applied in order to ensure the sugar had originated in the UK. But trade deflection can extend to product substitution. The EU would not want to import sugar produced from sugar beet grown in the UK, for example, if the bulk of supplies for the UK's domestic consumption was derived from imported raw cane sugar, displacing British-grown product onto the EU 27 market. As foreshadowed in the Joint Report of December 2017, EU 27 might insist that the UK applies a similar, if not the same, trade regime on third-country imports.
Consequently, the UK government's stated objective of achieving 'a new customs arrangement that facilitates the freest and most frictionless trade possible in goods between the UK and the EU', particularly for agri-food products over the Irish border, could conceivably result in the EU demanding that the UK retains trade restrictions on CAP products comparable to those currently applied, as well as shadowing the EU's regulatory measures.
9 Under these circumstances, the UK would not be at liberty to adopt a free (or freer) trade stance, or negotiate its own FTAs with low-cost agricultural suppliers such as Brazil or Australia. Although notionally free of the EU's Customs Union and Single Market, and its CAP, the UK would have in place similar trade barriers and would have become, in effect, a satellite state of the EU-indeed, some members of the British Parliament have talked about the UK becoming a vassal state. As a satellite state -having still to apply the CAP's trade barriers-it would be unable to strike its own agri-food trade deals around the world, or unilaterally reduce its tariffs. The other extreme is a 'hard' ('clean') Brexit. With this outcome, the UK might have no formal trade links with EU 27, other than those contingent on WTO membership. Under these circumstances, UK agri-food exports to EU 27 would face the EU's prohibitively high MFN tariffs, and a correspondingly 'hard' border would be in place on the island of Ireland, rupturing existing north-south trade links with consequential damage to the agriculture, food and drink industries on both sides of the border.
A 'hard' Brexit could result in a number of trade scenarios. In one extreme outcome, the UK might unilaterally opt for free trade, offering duty-and quota-free access to all WTO suppliers, including EU 27, without obtaining reciprocal admittance. This might be contrasted with a situation in which the UK adopts a protectionist stance, sheltering its agriculture behind the tariffs on CAP products inherited from its EU membership, whilst entering no new trade partnerships with either EU 27 or other WTO members.
10 Between these two extremes, one might imagine (1) the UK negotiating a single FTA-with Australia, for example-offering that country significant preferential access to its protected food markets, through (2) multiple FTAs-with Australia, Brazil and the USA, for example-in which the margin of preference for each of its FTA partners would be reduced, to (3) numerous FTAs with virtually all potential suppliers, in which the impact on UK food supplies and prices would be barely different from unilateral free trade.
Other variants can also be envisaged, including exclusion of certain products (for example, beef) from FTAs or TRQ limits on their access, and partial or selected reductions in MFN tariffs. Quite where in this policy space the UK will end up is far from clear, and the uncertain outcome may well take a decade or more to emerge.
Agri-food trade and a UK-Australia FTA?
Brexit provides an unprecedented opportunity for the Australian red meat industry to enhance its trading relationship with the UK (MLA 2017). Securing duty free access for Australian raw cane sugar in the forthcoming trade discussions with the UK will provide opportunity for UK refiners to access increased quantities of Australian raw sugar on competitive terms. It will also enable Australian exporters to renew and develop commercial trading arrangements with the UK's sugar refiners. Establishing this environment will create good opportunities to grow Australia's raw sugar trade with the UK once it has exited the EU (ASA 2017).
As noted above, Meat & Livestock Australia, the Australian Sugar Industry Alliance and various other agri-food industry groups, in evidence to the Australian Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (2017) , have expressed optimism that Brexit will provide their industries with an opportunity to expand sales to the UK. Bearing in mind the discussion above, how likely is this?
It is not just the need to avoid disrupting trade between a post-Brexit UK and EU 27-including agri-food products over the Irish border-that suggests an outcome nearer the 'soft' Brexit, in which the UK becomes a satellite state of EU 27. Other political economy considerations also point to a UK agricultural sector retaining considerable border protection against other WTO suppliers.
The nation is divided geographically, with the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland more wedded to the idea of supporting farmers than the central government based in Westminster and Whitehall (Swinbank 2015) . Farmers in these regions are more heavily dependent on extensive livestock production (beef and sheep), for example, than the majority of farms in England-products that will likely prove uncompetitive in a global open-trading marketplace. As agricultural policy is a devolved responsibility (Keating 2018) , 'common frameworks' will need to, inter alia, 'enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence; ensure compliance with international obligations; [and] ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties' (DEFRA 2018, 59) . As with Australia's Commonwealth and state governments, it is the UK that has WTO membership. The UK government in London is negotiating with EU 27 and, post-Brexit, it will have responsibility for determining import tariffs, negotiating trade agreements (for example, FTAs with EU 27 and Australia) and ensuring the UK meets its WTO obligations under, for example, the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. How much influence the devolved administrations can bring to bear on these policy decisions remains to be seen.
In England, many Conservative Members of Parliament serve rural constituencies and, although the farm vote is small, the farm lobby can draw on significant sympathies. If support is to be withdrawn, it is more likely to be the more visible taxpayer-funded payments to farmers that would be eliminated, releasing money for electorally popular projects such as environmental protection and enhancement (DEFRA 2018), or the National Health Service, rather than the much less visible support provided by border protection. Abolition of the latter would deliver no (direct) cash bonanza for the public finances.
What, then, of Australia's agri-food trade prospects in the event of a hard/clean Brexit? Sugar can again be taken as a case in point. If (1) the UK negotiates an FTA with Australia, which includes sugar, but (2) fails to do so with other competitive suppliers such as Brazil, and (3) maintains its current MFN tariffs, then Australia will have a clear competitive advantage in the UK market (despite duty-and quota-free access for the rather highercost LDC and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) suppliers). If the UK also negotiates an FTA with Brazil, then Brazilian cane sugar (and ethanol), with shorter (and cheaper) transport links to the UK, may well hold a competitive advantage over Australian supplies. Finally, if the UK goes for free trade on all agri-food products, including refined sugar, then it may well end up importing refined sugar from EU 27 in competition with raw cane sugars from around the world and what remains of its own sugar-beet processing industry. In short, the devil lies in the detail.
In negotiating its own FTA with Australia, EU 27 will presumably be mindful of any likely EU 27-UK and UK-Australia FTAs that might be negotiated, and what their cumulative impact might be. For example, if EU 28 had been willing to offer Australia a dutyfree TRQ of x thousand tonnes of sugar, EU 27 might now offer a duty-free TRQ of x -y thousand tonnes in the expectation that the UK will offer Australia y thousand tonnes.
In seeking to negotiate an EU-Australia FTA, we might confidentially predict that one of the EU's offensive interests in the agri-food domain will be enhanced protection on Australian markets for the EU's extensive list of products bearing geographical indications of origin (GIs), as it has done in FTA agreements with other nations (Moir 2017) . For example, in its submission to the EU member states for opening negotiations with Australia, the European Commission said:
The Agreement should provide direct protection through the agreement of a list of GIs (wines, spirits, agricultural products and foodstuffs), at a high level of protection … including … enhanced enforcement, co-existence with 'bona fide' prior trademarks, protection against subsequent genericness [sic] and the possibility to add new GIs (European Commission 2017a, 7).
It is less easy to imagine what the UK's offensive interest over agri-food trade in a future FTA with Australia might be, which would enable it to present the overall package as advantageous for the UK's farm, food and drink industries. There are some small tariffs on processed foods imported into Australia that could be eliminated with some advantages for UK-based firms but, unlike its European counterparts, the UK has never been an enthusiastic advocate of GIs. In a recent consultation paper, the British government has said: 'we have a golden opportunity to help our farmers to grow more, sell more and export more great British food, building on our high quality brand. British food and farming has a world-class reputation for quality ' (DEFRA 2018, 61) . But it is not clear why an FTA with Australia would be particularly helpful in this regard.
Concluding comments
If the UK and EU 27 do agree on a transition period of about two years, in effect extending the UK's de facto membership of the EU's Customs Union, the UK will not be free to enter into new trading agreements with other partners until 2021. For the present UK government, however, committed as it is to Brexit, there is a strong political imperative to conclude FTAs as quickly as possible, and certainly before the next general election, scheduled for 2022, to demonstrate to the British electorate the success of its policies. Australia, as a like-minded Commonwealth country with a liberal trade regime and high product standards, is likely to be a priority candidate, despite its small market in comparison to other, more challenging FTA candidates such as the USA, Brazil, India and China. But unless the UK is willing to forego protecting its farm sector, an Australia-UK FTA that fully embraces agriculture faces considerable opposition in the UK, not least over the future status of the Irish border.
If the UK adopts the advice of the Economists for Free Trade, opting unilaterally for free trade, there will be interesting (perhaps profound) implications for the UK's economy and patterns of trade, but whether Australian agriculture will emerge as a major supplier of the UK's food and drink is a more open question-well beyond the scope of the present article. The situation in the late 2010s is quite different to that of the late 1960s. No longer is the UK the obvious outlet for Australian trade. Australia has newer, closer and more dynamic markets in the Asia-Pacific region, and would no longer benefit from Commonwealth preferences in a free-trade UK. 
